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In the last 30 years, academics and policymakers have shown increasing interest in the inde-
pendence of central banks. Especially during the 1990s, many countries around the world
adopted new central bank laws and granted their monetary institutions a greater degree
of autonomy [see e.g., Cukierman (2008)]. In the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty
has enabled the European Central Bank (ECB) to pursue monetary policy independent of
national governments. The United Kingdom granted the Bank of England full autonomy
in 1997 and many other countries followed suit. Figure 1 displays the evolution of central
bank independence (henceforth: CBI) from the 1980s to 2003 for a sample of 69 countries,
separately for OECD and non-OECD countries.1 It is clear that the vast majority of central
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Figure 1: The evolution of central bank independence and ination
At the same time, average ination rates have decreased in almost all countries. This
co-movement of independence and ination has occurred in both OECD or non-OECD
countries. As an example, OECD countries have on average experienced a reduction in
average ination by roughly 15 percentage points. CBI has on average increased by 0.30.
However, the scatter-plot shows no clear negative relationship between the changes in CBI
and the changes in ination. In addition, the empirical literature on this issue casts doubt
1 Indicators of central bank independence are taken from Cukierman et al. (1992) and Crowe and Meade (2007). Both
indicators are based on the methodology of Cukierman et al. (1992), overlap for 69 countries and are normalized to the unit
interval. Countries with ination rates above 50% are excluded from the gure.
2on the eectiveness of CBI for price stability. Although earlier studies primarily identify
a negative link between CBI and ination, especially in industrialized countries [see e.g.,
Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992) or Alesina and Summers (1993)], the results of more
recent studies are rather ambiguous [see e.g., Eijnger and de Haan (1996), Campillo and
Miron (1997) or Klomp and de Haan (2010)]. The previous literature has made nume-
rous attempts to explain the impact of CBI on ination using dierent indicators of CBI,
employing dierent sample periods and countries and controlling for all kinds of additio-
nal determinants of ination. Surprisingly, comparatively few attempts have been made
to study the conditions under which CBI can enhance a country's ination performance.
While many studies include a wide variety of control variables for ination, the literature
sparely addresses the interaction between certain control variables { e.g., the quality of poli-
tical institutions { and CBI. In this paper, we argue that the quality of political institutions
is an important determinant of the relationship between CBI and ination.
From a theoretical point of view, increasing CBI helps to solve time-inconsistency pro-
blems by strengthening the reputation of monetary policy. However, indicators of CBI
convey little information about the credibility of such an arrangement. To achieve the
benecial reputation eects of CBI, the established institutional design needs to be cre-
dible. High-quality political institutions might generally be associated with greater trust
in governmental decisions and legal arrangements. As a result, the quality of institutions
might be a positive determinant of the reputation eects of CBI. Chile and Venezuela pro-
vide helpful anecdotal evidence in support of our hypothesis. In the 1980s, both countries
suered from similarly high average ination rates (21% and 20%). In addition, Chile
and Venezuela increased the independence of their central banks to a similar extent (0.33
and 0.37).2 However, whereas Chile established price stability in the rst decade of the
twenty-rst century (with an average ination rate of around 3%), the ination problem
in Venezuela persisted. The remarkably dierent ination performance of these two coun-
tries may be reected in discrepancies in institutional quality. If we measure institutional
quality on the basis of political stability, rule of law or democratic accountability using the
World Bank's governance indicators [Kaufmann et al. (2009)], Chile displays much higher
institutional quality on average than does Venezuela (0.64 / 0.74 / 0.65 and 0.31 / 0.29 /
0.42). These dierences may be crucial to the reputation of monetary policy design and
hence to the eectiveness of CBI. We expect that institutional quality directly inuences
the marginal eect of CBI on ination.
2 Detailed data descriptions can be found in section 3.1 and in the appendix.
3The main questions of our paper are as follows. Can we identify a relationship between CBI
and ination? If so, does the institutional quality of countries inuence this relationship?
How do institutional quality and CBI interact with each other?
To answer the above questions, we examine a dataset of up to 69 countries. Unlike in
most of the literature, which primarily focuses on pure cross-section samples, we study the
relationship between CBI and ination by exploiting the time dimension of CBI data. Ad-
ditionally, we allow for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between CBI and ination.
The impact of institutional quality on the marginal eect of CBI is studied by estimating
interaction models. Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. Institutional qua-
lity has a signicant impact on the relationship between CBI and ination. Increasing
institutional quality is correlated with improved CBI eectiveness for a country's ination
performance. Our analysis reveals that granting a central bank more autonomy does not
necessarily lead to better ination performance. To lower ination by increasing indepen-
dence, two conditions have to be fullled: (1) The change in independence needs to be
suciently large, and (2) the quality of institutions has to be suciently high.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 briey discusses the theoretical and empirical
literature on the relationship between CBI and ination. In Section 2.2, we discuss the role
of institutional quality in the eectiveness of CBI with regard to ination performance
enhancement. Section 3.1 describes the empirical methodology and the dataset. Section
3.2 presents the estimation results. A large number of robustness checks are presented in
Section 3.3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Some theoretical considerations
2.1 The link between CBI and ination
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence is based on the research on time-
inconsistent policies [Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983)]. Rogo
(1985) shows in his seminal paper that a society will see its welfare increase after appointing
a conservative central banker and isolating monetary policy from political pressure. Hence,
central bank independence in combination with a stronger focus on price stability helps to
ease the inationary bias. As a result, for a given degree of conservatism, CBI should be
negatively related to ination rates.
The empirical evidence backing the conventional view that central bank independence
4helps to achieve low ination is somewhat mixed. Eijnger and de Haan (1996), Berger
et al. (2001), Hayo and Hefeker (2008) provide excellent reviews of the empirical literature.
One stylized fact that emerges from earlier studies is a negative relationship between CBI
and the level of ination, especially in industrialized countries. The results of more recent
studies are rather inconclusive. For example, when high-ination observations are excluded
or certain control variables are included, the negative relationship is not very robust [see
e.g., Sturm and de Haan (2001), Fuhrer (1997)]. A recent meta-regression analysis by
Klomp and de Haan (2010) indicates omitted variable biases in previous empirical studies
and shows that the ndings are sensitive to sample periods and applied CBI indicators. In
addition, some research casts serious doubt on the direction of causality and argues in favor
of the endogeneity of central bank independence. For example, Posen (1995) shows that
the degree of CBI is determined by the strength of nancial sector opposition to ination.
This means that the direction of causality may run from ination to CBI.
There may be various reasons for the ambiguous ndings. First, there are no precise
measures of CBI. Most existing studies make use of indices of statutory central bank inde-
pendence [see e.g., Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. (1992), Alesina
and Summers (1993), Cukierman et al. (2002), Guti errez (2003), J acome and V azquez
(2008), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2009), Arnone et al. (2009)]. A crucial argument against the
use of such measures is that informal practices might dier substantially from formal rules.
Particularly in developing and transition countries, there is a discrepancy between rules
and practices [see e.g., Forder (1996, 1998), Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004)]. Fry (1998)
shows that legal independence poorly reects actual independence. Various attempts have
been undertaken to measure actual independence. For example, the turnover rate develo-
ped by Cukierman (1992) is the most commonly used measure. Other measures are the
survey indicator by Cukierman (1992) and the political susceptibility index by Cukierman
and Webb (1995), as well as measures based on the estimation of central bank reaction
functions [e.g., Eijnger et al. (1996)]. However, most existing measures only capture
some limited aspect of actual CBI.
Second, the literature often does not properly distinguish between conservatism and inde-
pendence [e.g., Berger et al. (2001), Hayo and Hefeker (2002)]. According to the seminal
work of Rogo (1985), the inationary bias depends on the combination of central bank
independence and conservatism. Thus, the empirical evidence on the relation between CBI
and ination may be distorted when diering levels of conservatism are not taken into
account.
5Third, the time-dimension of central bank independence and ination data has been widely
neglected up until now. In earlier studies, this was primarily due to a lack of time-variant
indicators of independence. A recent study by Crowe and Meade (2008) nds a signicant
negative relationship between CBI and ination when exploiting the time dimension of
the dataset but is unable to identify a signicant link in a pure cross-section analysis.
One reason for this result might be that exploiting the time dimension of the dataset may
diminish possible omitted variable bias.
Fourth, the marginal eect of CBI on ination may not be constant. Earlier studies nd a
signicant relationship between CBI and ination, but this is the case only for a sample of
industrialized countries [e.g., Cukierman et al. (1992)]. Temple (1998) also shows that the
eect of CBI on ination disappears if higher ination economies are included. He argues
that one reason for this might be a nonlinear eect of CBI. However, to our knowledge,
there are no studies so far that explicitly take nonlinear eects into account.
Fifth, existing empirical studies provide little evidence on the conditions under which CBI
can have benecial eects on ination performance. While many studies include a wide
variety of control variables for ination, the literature sparely addresses the interaction
between certain control variables { e.g., the quality of political institutions { and CBI. Two
notable exceptions are the papers by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) and Hayo and Voigt
(2008). We argue that the quality of political institutions is an important determinant of
the link between CBI and ination.
This paper mainly addresses the latter three issues. We follow a comparative-static ap-
proach to study the impact of institutional quality on the link between CBI and ination
and consider possible nonlinearities in the eect of independence. The rst two issues; i.e.,
possible measurement problems of actual CBI and the distinction between conservatism
and independence, are not the primary focus of our analysis. However, we try to address
these issues in the robustness section of this paper.
2.2 The role of institutional quality
The quality of institutions matters in attempts to assess the link between CBI and ination
for various reasons. First, it is a determinant of ination and thus a necessary control
variable in estimations. For example, Campillo and Miron (1997) show that politically
unstable countries have higher ination rates and that CBI does not help to explain a
country's ination history. Second, political institutions might be a determinant of CBI.
6For example, countries with good checks and balances grant their monetary institutions
greater autonomy [e.g., Moser (1999), Keefer and Stasavage (2000) or Farvaque (2002)].
Hence, measures of the quality of institutions represent potential instruments for legal
CBI that can be used to cope with endogeneity problems related to CBI and ination
[e.g., Crowe and Meade (2008)]. Third, and most importantly from our point of view, the
quality of political institutions might directly inuence the relationship between CBI and
ination. There is only little evidence on this issue. For example, Keefer and Stasavage
(2003) show that the eectiveness of central bank independence in strengthening credibility
and enhancing ination performance is increased by the presence of multiple political veto
players. Hayo and Voigt (2008) also nd evidence that a signicant relation between CBI
and ination only exists if checks and balances are suciently strong.
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between CBI and ination can be explained
as follows. Increasing the level of CBI helps to solve time-inconsistency problems by en-
hancing the reputation of monetary policy. Hence, ination expectations can be anchored
at a low level, which helps to perpetuate price stability. However, to achieve the benecial
reputation eects of CBI, the institutional design needs to be credible. Whereas the most
indicators of CBI primarily reect information regarding the legal status quo of the central
bank design, they hardly contain information on the credibility of such an arrangement.
Even though independence prevents short-run monetary policy from being subject to po-
litical inuence, the choice of a central bank design might still be susceptible to political
pressure, which would prevent reputation building.
We argue that the quality of political institutions is crucial to the credibility of central
bank design. High-quality political institutions might generally be associated with a higher
level of trust in governmental decisions and legal arrangements. As a result, the quality
of political institutions might be a positive determinant of the reputation eects of CBI.
Aspects of institutional quality that we expect to be particularly important are the stability
and eectiveness of the government and the bureaucratic system, democratic accountability
and the rule of law. For example, in a democracy, any political action bears the risk of
punishment by the voters. The opportunity for punishment increases the accountability of
policy-makers. Under the assumption that central bank independence is socially benecial
[see Rogo (1985)] greater democratic accountability makes it more costly for politicians
to deviate from the socially preferred central bank design and thus increases the credibility
of CBI. We also expect political stability to have an impact on the credibility of CBI. For
example, frequent government changes may precipitate revisions to central bank design and
7have a negative impact on the credibility of the legal design of monetary policy. However,
even in an unstable government, the impact of government changes may be counteracted
by the existence of a strong and high-quality bureaucratic system that can act as a shock
absorber and minimize policy revision [see e.g., Busse and Hefeker (2007)]. Finally, the
rule of law as a general indicator of trust in the legal system might also indirectly reect
the level of trust in government institutions, including the central bank.
For the reasons mentioned, we argue that institutional quality should not simply be used as
a control variable in explaining ination or as an instrument for CBI; rather, it should be
directly linked to the marginal eect of CBI on ination. Hence, our empirical strategy is
to identify the impact of measures of the quality of political institutions on the relationship
between CBI and ination using interaction models.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Empirical specication and data
To address our research questions, we use the following procedure. First, we follow the
approach used by Crowe and Meade (2008) and estimate the impact of the changes in CBI
on the changes in ination. Next, we control for possible nonlinearities in the marginal
eect of CBI on ination. Then, we incorporate dierent measures of the quality of political
institutions as control variables and interact these measures with the change in CBI. Finally,
we check the robustness of our ndings.
Any analysis of the link between CBI and ination is restricted by the availability of time-
varying data on CBI. We use data on central bank independence provided by Cukierman
et al. (1992) for the period 1980-1989 and the index by Crowe and Meade (2007) for the year
2003. Note that the indicators are comparable because both are based on the methodology
developed by Cukierman et al. (1992). The two samples overlap for 69 countries. All
denitions and data sources are provided in the appendix A.2. The sample countries are
summarized in Table A.6.
As mentioned above, exploiting the time dimension may diminish possible omitted variable
bias. In the simple linear version of our 'comparative-static' cross-section approach the
estimation equation has the following form:
i = 0 + 1  80=89;i + 2  CBIi + i; (1)
8where the dependent variable i reects the change in the average ination rate bet-
ween (1980-1989) and (1998-2007) in country i, i.e.  = 80=89   98=07.3 The variable
80=89;i represents average ination in the rst period (1980-1989) and controls for initial
level eects. In the empirical analysis, we also make use of the ination tax T as an
alternative measure of ination performance. The ination tax (dened as T = =(1+))
is a commonly used measure in the unit interval, reecting the depreciation rate of mo-
ney and reducing the impact of hyperination observations as well as heteroscedasticity
[e.g., Cukierman et al. (1992), Crowe and Meade (2008)]. The variable CBIi denotes the
change in the indicator values of Crowe and Meade (2007) and Cukierman et al. (1992): i.e.,
CBI = CBI98=07 CBI80=89. Hence, it represents the evolution of CBI over time. Accor-
ding to the theoretical rationale for CBI, we would expect an increase in CBI (CBI > 0)
to result in a decrease in ination ( > 0, T > 0), which would correspond to a positive
sign of the coecient 2.4
To control for possible nonlinearities, we extend equation (1) by a quadratic term for the
change in independence ((CBI)2), resulting in
i = 0 + 1  80=89;i + 2  CBIi + 3  (CBIi)
2 + i: (2)
A positive value of 3 would imply that the marginal eect of increasing CBI is positively
related to the magnitude of CBI changes. A negative value of 3 would imply that the
marginal eect of increasing CBI is negatively related to the magnitude of CBI changes.
Hence, large changes in CBI result in a disproportionate decrease (increase) in ination
relative to small changes. As shown in the results section below, we nd evidence of
nonlinearities. Hence, in the following, we use the quadratic specication of equation (2).
To analyze the impact of the quality of institutions on the CBI-ination nexus, we specify






where IQi is a measure of institutional quality. We use a wide variety of potential proxies
for institutional quality, namely democratic accountability, political stability, government
eectiveness, regulatory quality, corruption, rule of law and freedom of press from dierent
data sources. The corresponding sources and denitions are described in the appendix A.2.
3 The period from 1980 to 1989 coincides with the sample of the indicator by Cukierman et al. (1992). Because Crowe and
Meade (2007) construct their indicator of CBI based on the legal status in the year 2003 we calculate average ination rates
for a comparable 10-year interval around that year (1998-2007).
4 Note again that due to the denition of the variables, we expect a positive 2 because the change in CBI is dened as
CBI = CBI98=07   CBI80=89 but the change in the ination is dened as  = 80=89   98=07.
9In equation (3), institutional quality interacts with the changes in CBI. The interaction
model implies that the marginal eect of a change in CBI on ination performance depends
on the value of the conditioning variable institutional quality. In other words, a positive
6 indicates that for a given CBI, the marginal eect increases when IQi increases; i.e.,
the eectiveness of changes in CBI is larger for better institutions. To properly interpret
the interaction terms, we must include the level of institutional quality IQi [see Brambor
et al. (2006)]. As in the case of CBI, we allow for nonlinearities in the eect of institutional
quality and include a quadratic term (IQ2
i).5 Based on equation (3), the marginal eect of
a change in CBI on a change in ination is given by
@
@CBI
= ^ 2 + 2^ 3  CBI + ^ 6  IQ (4)






= var(^ 2) + 4(CBI)
2  var(^ 3) + IQ
2  var(^ 6) + 4CBI  cov(^ 2^ 3) (5)
+2IQ  cov(^ 2^ 6) + 4(IQ  CBI)  cov(^ 3^ 6):
3.2 Empirical results
Results I
Table 1 displays the results regarding the link between the change in CBI and the change
in ination not considering the impact of the quality of institutions (see equations (1) and
(2)).6 Column (1) presents the estimation results for equation (1). We are able to explain
a large proportion of the variance in the change in ination (adj. R2 of 82%). As expected,
the initial level of ination is highly signicant. The positive sign of coecient 1 indicates
that the decrease in ination is higher in countries with poor initial ination performance.
Contrary to our expectations, the coecient of CBI is negative. Note that this implies
that increasing CBI is associated with an increase in ination. However, the coecient does
not turn out to be signicant in this specication. In column (2), we use the ination tax T
as a measure of ination performance. The qualitative results are unchanged. According
to the estimations of the simple specication in equation (1), increasing the independence
of a central bank does not seem to come along with enhanced ination performance.
5 The results below indeed indicate that nonlinearities seem to be particularly relevant for government eectiveness, rule of
law, regulatory quality and corruption
6 In Table 1, we compute White standard errors [White (1980)]. Standard test indicate heteroscedasticity (results available
upon request). However, the sample is rather small and the statistical properties of the White estimator are quite uncertain
in such samples. Therefore, we also display the results based on ordinary standard errors in Table A.1 in the appendix.
10Table 1: Results of equation (1) and (2).
Dependent variable: Change in ination () or ination tax (
T)
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant -0.307 -0.042*** -0.132 -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.019**
(-1.25) (-3.89) (-0.92) (-3.89) (-3.30) (-2.23)




80=89 { { { 0.924*** { { { 0.947*** { { { 0.802***
(19.77) (18.40) (7.58)
CBI -0.733 -0.038 -4.471 -0.237* -0.264** -0.135**
(-0.95) (-1.14) (-1.03) (-1.99) (-2.50) (-2.46)
(CBI)
2 { { { { { { 7.007 0.368* 0.467** 0.218**
(1.03) (1.92) (2.18) (2.52)
No. observ. 69 69 69 69 62 62
adj. R
2 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.65 0.72
F-statistic 146.78*** 123.38*** 97.85*** 85.56*** 38.78*** 53.56***
All columns with odd numbers refer to the change in ination and all columns with even numbers
refer to the change in ination tax. In columns (5) and (6) all countries which experienced an
absolute change in ination of more than 200 percentage points are excluded. All t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1%-
signicance-level.
Columns (3)-(6) display the results of the estimation of the nonlinear specication in equa-
tion (2). The results in column (3) and (4) are based on an estimation using the complete
sample of 69 countries. With the change in ination rates as the dependent variable (co-
lumn (3)), only the initial level turns out to be signicant. However, the estimation results
on the basis of the ination tax (column (4)) now dier heavily. The constant and the
initial level are highly signicant. As in the linear specication, the coecient of CBI
is negative but now becomes signicant at the 10%-level. The coecient of the quadra-
tic term (CBI)2 is signicantly positive; i.e., the marginal eect of increasing CBI on
changes in ination is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes. Hence, countries
with large changes in CBI seem to have, on average, experienced a disproportionate change
in their ination tax relative to countries with small changes.
The dierence in the results between ination and ination taxes indicates that the insigni-
cance in column (3) are due to an outlier bias of high ination observations. In columns
(5) and (6) we, thus, exclude the seven countries which experienced an increase or a de-
crease in ination of more than 200 percentage points. The results are now similar to those
in column (4). As a consequence, we control for the outlier eect in the remainder of the
paper. Smoothing the change in the ination performance using ination taxes seems to
11be the adequate procedure which allows to keep all cross section information and which is
also in line with much of the empirical literature.
Even if the coecients of CBI and (CBI)2 are signicant, the overall marginal eect
might be insignicant. Table 2 presents the marginal eect @T=@CBI = 2 + 2  3 
CBI based on equation (2) for the specication with the entire sample in column (4).
Table 2: Marginal eect of change in CBI on change in ination tax.
CBI 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
@T=@CBI -0.164* -0.090* -0.017 0.057 0.131 0.204* 0.278* 0.351*
Estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Signicance levels are
reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% signicance-level. The variance of the
marginal eect is given by ^ 2 = var(^ 2) + 4  (CBI)2  var(^ 3) + 4  CBI  cov(^ 2^ 3).
Table 2 reveals that for small changes in independence, the marginal eect is signicantly
negative. Only for changes in CBI above 0.54, we are able to identify a signicantly positive
relation between an increase in independence and ination performance.7
Although we were not able to identify a signicant relationship between CBI and ination
in the linear specication, controlling for possible nonlinearities reveals that CBI might be
negatively related to ination performance when there are large variations in CBI. Due to
the empirical relevance of the nonlinearities, we continue to use the quadratic specication.
Results II
To analyze the impact of the quality of institutions on the link between CBI and ina-
tion, we estimate the interaction model specied in equation (3). The estimates for two
measures of institutional quality (democratic accountability and political stability) from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset [PRS-Group (2007)] as well as for dif-
ferent specications are displayed in Table 3. In addition, Table A.3 in the appendix shows
the estimates (i) for other institutional quality measures (government eectiveness, rule
of law, regulatory quality, corruption and the freedom of press) and (ii) for dierent data
sources (ICRG, World Bank and Freedom House data).8
7 Note, that we cannot interpret causality on the basis of the results in Table 2 since CBI may be endogenous. In section 3.3,
we also control for possible endogeneity problems. Also, we might still face omitted variable bias in this specication due
to the lack of control variables.
8 See description of data in the appendix A.2. Furthermore, Table A.2 in the appendix replicates Table 3 on the basis of
ordinary standard errors.
12Table 3: Results for Democracy Accountability and Political Stability (alternative specications)
Dependent variable: Change in ination tax
{Political Stability{ {Democratic Accountability{
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant -0.185** 0.120 -0.660* -0.063 -0.286* 0.100 -1.027*** -0.220
(-2.64) (0.54) (-1.87) (-0.24) (-1.69) (0.56) (-3.76) (-1.14)

T
80=89 1.014*** 1.074*** 1.271*** 1.113*** 0.984*** 1.051*** 1.024*** 1.108***
(16.57) (18.59) (8.49) (20.82) (19.63) (23.26) (11.85) (17.63)
CBI -0.353 -0.425** -0.630** -0.297 -0.536* -0.604** -0.561*** -0.472
(-1.64) (-2.05) (-2.17) (-0.57) (-1.82) (-2.34) (-3.04) (-0.79)
(CBI)
2 0.279* 0.292** 0.119* 0.577 0.172 0.139 0.034 0.162
(1.79) (2.25) (1.90) (0.84) (1.58) (1.44) (0.52) (0.34)
IQ 0.495* 0.268 0.615 0.638 0.893 0.621 2.674*** 1.090*
(1.87) (1.26) (1.22) (1.68) (1.37) (1.60) (4.38) (1.85)
(IQ)
2 -0.375 -0.125 -0.513 -0.418 -0.717 -0.388 -1.908*** -0.973*
(-1.55) (-0.62) (-1.14) (-1.01) (-1.26) (-1.39) (-4.25) (-1.93)
IQCBI 0.272 0.434* 0.795* -0.102 0.577 0.748** 0.680*** 0.589
(1.13) (1.76) (2.11) (-0.13) (1.62) (2.26) (3.18) (0.60)
GDP80=89 { { { 0.007 0.015* 0.013 { { { 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.90) (1.83) (0.51) (0.86) (0.85) (0.49)
GDPpc80=89 { { { -0.014 0.030 -0.003 { { { -0.024 0.004 -0.001
(-0.57) (1.02) (-0.09) (-1.18) (0.25) (-0.05)
TRADE80=89 { { { -0.043* 0.018 -0.056 { { { -0.042** 0.006 -0.037
(-1.85) (0.89) (-1.10) (-2.62) (0.54) (-1.39)
GDP { { { 0.077 -0.097 0.080 { { { 0.110 0.021 0.031
(0.99) (-1.05) (0.79) (1.43) (0.41) (0.35)
GDPpc { { { -0.015 0.153 -0.007 { { { -0.047 -0.032 0.093
(-0.17) (1.36) (-0.05) (-0.51) (-0.46) (0.87)
TRADE { { { -0.137** -0.022 -0.160 { { { -0.133*** -0.003 -0.145**
(-2.37) (-0.88) (-1.37) (-2.95) (-0.08) (-2.07)
PEGGED { { { 0.018 -0.006 0.022 { { { 0.019 0.005 0.024
(1.33) (-0.63) (0.85) (1.35) (0.66) (0.70)
East Asian { { { 0.027 { { { { { { { { { 0.045 { { { { { {
(0.75) (1.13)
Latin American { { { 0.012 { { { { { { { { { 0.004 { { { { { {
(0.36) (0.12)
Sub-Saharan { { { -0.084 { { { { { { { { { -0.097* { { { { { {
(-1.38) (-1.92)
No. observ. 69 68 30 38 69 68 30 38
adj. R
2 0.84 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.89
F-statistic 59.22*** 37.45*** 26.98*** 20.21*** 65.68*** 49.41*** 65.63*** 24.79***
Estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% signicance-level.
Columns (1) to (4) show the estimation results for the measure of political stability. Co-
lumns (5) to (8) display the results for the measure of democratic accountability. The
results of the baseline specication (equation (3)) are shown in columns (1) and (5). Re-
levant control variables, as proposed by Campillo and Miron (1997), are considered in
columns (2) and (6).9 We add the initial levels of (log)GDP (GDP80=89), (log)GDP per ca-
pita (GDPpc80=89) and the (log)trade volume relative to GDP (TRADE80=89) as a proxy for
openness. Dierent from Campillo and Miron (1997), we additionally include the change of
the latter three variables since we follow a comparative-static approach in this paper [see
Crowe and Meade (2008)]. The level of GDP is included to control for country size eects,
9 See detailed data description in the appendix. Note, that in this case Serbia is excluded from the sample because data is
not available for all control variables. Due to data restrictions we do not include the debt ratio.
13the GPD per capita controls for various structural disparities as dierences in the nancial
sector, technologies or optimal ination [see Campillo and Miron (1997)]. According to Ro-
mer (1993), openness should be negatively related to average ination. Surprise expansion
of monetary policy is less benecial in open economies because real exchange rate depre-
ciations that come along with monetary expansion are more harmful in such countries.
Furthermore, we account for the fact that monetary policy may have been restricted by the
exchange rate system. By pegging its currency, a country can import ination and may
then experience a decrease in ination that cannot be attributed to central bank design.
Using a classication by Caramazza and Aziz (1998), we include a dummy for countries
that are either classied as "pegged" or "limited exible" (PEGGED).10 We also incorporate
dummies for Sub-Saharan, East Asian and Latin American countries to control for regional
eects.
The remaining four columns address the issue that previous studies prevalently identied
a signicant relationship between CBI and ination for industrialized countries only. One
reason might be that legal CBI is a precise measure of factual CBI only in such countries.
There is some evidence that de facto central bank behavior heavily deviates from de jure
rules in developing and transition countries [Forder (1996, 1998), Berlemann and Nenovsky
(2004)]. Therefore, we split the sample in OECD (columns (3) and (7)) and non-OECD
countries (columns (4) and (8)).11
Again, the initial level turns out to be highly relevant in all specications. In column (1),
the coecient of CBI is negative but insignicant. The coecient of the quadratic term
(CBI)2 is signicant at the 10% level, indicating that the marginal eect of increasing
CBI on changes in ination is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes. The
coecient of the political stability measure is signicantly positive. More institutional
quality seems to be associated with a higher decrease in ination tax over time. However,
the coecient of the quadratic term is negative which implies that the disinationary
benets of high institutional quality decrease in the level of institutional quality. But this
eect is not found to be signicant in this specication (p-value of 0.13). The coecient of
the interaction term IQCBI has the expected positive sign, but is insignicant. This
is also true for the measure of democratic accountability in column (5). However, adding
the control variables in columns (2) and (6) has a major impact on the signicance of the
10Because most changes in central bank design occurred in the 1990s, we use the classication by Caramazza and Aziz (1998),
which refers to 1997.
11Note, that further splitting the sample, e.g. to analyze transition countries, would leave us with a very scarce number of
observations. We also address the issue of a deviation of factual from legal CBI by using turnover rates of central bank
presidents in the robustness section 3.3.
14parameters. In particular, the coecient of the interaction term becomes signicant. On
the basis of the results in columns (2) and (6) we nd evidence in favor of our hypothesis
that institutional quality matters for the link between CBI and ination.12 Since robustness
test reveal that including control variables yields the most stable results across dierent
specications, we continue to do so in the remainder of the paper.13 With respect to the
control variables, we only nd evidence in favor of the hypothesis that openness is inversely
related to ination. The coecients of both the level and change of openness turn out to
be signicantly negative.
The evidence in favor of a signicant link between institutional quality and CBI eectiveness
only seems to hold for highly developed countries. Analyzing the subsample of OECD
countries in columns (3) and (7) reveals that the interaction term remains signicant and
is even larger than in the complete sample. For non-OECD countries (columns (4) and (8)),
we are not able to identify a signicant impact of institutional quality on the eectiveness
of CBI. As mentioned above, this might be due to the fact that legal CBI is not a good
proxy for factual CBI in developing and transition countries.
The interaction model asserts that the eect of CBI on T depends on the value
of the conditioning variable institutional quality (IQ). We now calculate the marginal
eects and the corresponding condence intervals on the basis of equations (4) and (5).
To illustrate how the marginal eect of the CBI change on the change in the ination
tax varies with institutional quality, the marginal eect is plotted in Figure 2. The gure
displays the marginal eect for the specication in column (2). The solid black line denotes
the marginal eect for CBI = 0:5. Condence bands for the 10%-signicance level are
included. To compare the marginal eects for dierent levels of CBI, we insert thin grey
lines reecting the marginal eect for CBI = 0:3 and CBI = 0:7.
Figure 2 reveals that the slope of the marginal eect is positive; i.e., more political stability
improves the eectiveness of CBI. Furthermore, a larger (smaller) change in CBI shifts
the marginal eect upwards (downwards). The shift in the marginal eect induced by
higher values of CBI is statistically signicant because the coecient of the quadratic
term is signicant. For CBI = 0:5, the marginal eect is negative but insignicant in
case of low political stability. The cuto value of political stability (i.e., the value for
which @T=@CBI = 0) is 0.31. The marginal eect is statistically signicant with 90%
12Table 4 presents more evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In most specications and for most institutional quality measure,
the interaction term is signicantly positive.




































































Figure 2: Marginal eect of CBI on 
T: Political Stability.
condence for values of political stability above 0.50.14
Finally, we summarize the interaction terms for a number of dierent specications and
measures of institutional quality in Table 4 to illustrate which aspects of political insti-
tutions are particularly relevant to the eectiveness of CBI. The interaction term directly
quanties the impact of institutional quality on the link between ination and indepen-
dence. In addition to democratic accountability and political stability Table 4 also contains
the results for dierent institutional quality measures, namely government eectiveness,
rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption and freedom of press. Moreover, Table 4 displays
the results of two dierent data sources, (1) ICRG and (2) world bank data. Only the
data quantifying the freedom of press is taken from FreedomHouse (2008). We also per-
form a number of robustness checks by estimating various specications. Specication (A)
is based on estimates using the complete sample and the specication as in equation (3)
without additional control variables. In (B) control variables as in columns (2) and (6)
of Table 3 are included. To test whether our ndings are driven by the richest or poorest
countries, we drop countries that belong to the richest and poorest 5% in the sample in
specication (C). In (D), we exclude countries with average annual ination rates above
50% in one of the sample periods (1980-1989, 1998-2007) to address the ndings by Sturm
and de Haan (2001) on the eect of high-ination observations. As a last robustness check,
we use ICRG data on internal conicts to drop the 10% of the countries with the strongest
14Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix graphically show the calculated marginal eects based on ordinary standard errors
[column (2) in Table A.2] and for democratic accountability [column (6) in Table 3]. The results are very similar.
16internal conicts (such as civil war, terrorism and civil disorder) in (E). The signicance
is analyzed using both ordinary and heteroscedasticity resistent standard errors [White
(1980)].
Table 4: Overview of the interaction term coecient for various specications and institutional quality measures
Dependent variable: Change in ination tax
Spec. Data -Pol. Stab- -Democr. Acc.- -Gov. Eff.- -Rule of Law- -Req. Qual.- -Corr.- -Fr. of Press-
(A) (1) 0.28*/ 0.17/++ 0.42*/++ 0.18/ 0.55**/+++ 0.35*/+
0.45/++
(2) 0.40*/+ 0.58*/++ 0.25/ 0.18/ 0.30*/
(B) (1) 0.40*/+ 0.75**/+++ 0.41*/++ 0.39/+ 0.49**/+++ 0.39**/++
0.57**/+++
(2) 0.64/ 0.66*/++ 0.43**/++ 0.47/+ 0.40**/++
(C) (1) 0.15/ 0.26*/+ 0.18**/++ 0.17/ 0.27**/++ 0.18**/++
0.21***/++
(2) 0.35/ 0.28**/+ 0.32***/+++ 0.25*/+ 0.16**/
(D) (1) 0.57**/++ 0.86**/+++ 0.40*/+ 0.48*/+ 0.47*/++ 0.42*/+
0.57**/+++
(2) 1.09/ 0.66*/++ 0.49*/++ 0.61*/++ 0.40**/+
(E) (1) 0.22/ 0.59*/+ 0.36/+ 0.35/ 0.31/ 0.39/+
0.50*/++
(2) 0.43/ 0.57/+ 0.43/+ 0.53/+ 0.31*/
The table contains the coecients of the interaction term. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, **
for a 5% and *** for a 1% signicance-level (for estimates using White standard errors) / + for a 10%, ++ for a 5%
and +++ for a 1% signicance-level (using ordinary standard errors). (A) is based on estimates using the complete
sample and the specication as in equation (3) without additional control variables, (B) includes control variables as
in columns (2) and (6) of table Table 3, (C) drops high-ination countries with an annual average ination above
50% in (1980, 1989) or (1998, 2007), (D) excludes the highest and lowest 5% in income per capita, and (E) leaves out
the 10% of countries with the strongest internal conicts (ICRG-data). (1) is based on ICRG-data and (2) is based
on data of institutional quality from the world bank. Only the data quantifying the freedom of press is taken from
FreedomHouse (2008).
We can summarize the ndings as follows. The interaction term is positive in all 10 speci-
cations and for each measure of institutional quality; i.e., increasing institutional quality
occurs along with improved eectiveness of CBI in terms of ination performance. Not sur-
prisingly, the evidence does not dier substantially for dierent measures of institutional
quality; this can be explained by the strong correlation between the dierent measures. In
any event, on the basis of Table 4, we can cautiously conclude that democratic accounta-
bility, government eectiveness, corruption and the freedom of press seem to matter most
to CBI eectiveness.
The analysis in this section has revealed that granting a central bank more autonomy
does not necessarily lead to better ination performance. To be able to lower ination by
increasing independence, two conditions must be fullled: (1) The change in independence
must be suciently large, and (2) the quality of institutions must be suciently high.15
Based on the specication in column (2) of Table 3, the data for our sample countries
imply that only 13 countries (around 19%) are characterized by a combination of CBI
15The evidence of the robustness section 3.3 indicates that endogeneity of CBI is a negligible problem. Hence, we are able to
interpret the results in this section as causation.
17and a level of political stability for which a decrease in the ination tax can be partially
attributed to innovations in central bank design.
3.3 Robustness
We perform a number of robustness checks by estimating dierent specications and ad-
dressing endogeneity issues as well as data problems to verify that the results are stable.
The qualitative results do not change no matter which specication or estimation procedure
is used.
First, we test whether the signicance of parameters is driven by the use of robust standard
errors [White (1980)]. Even though standard tests indicate heteroscedasticity, the statisti-
cal properties of the White estimator are quite uncertain in such small samples. Tables A.1
and A.2 in the appendix replicate Tables 1 and 3 using ordinary standard errors. The signi-
cance seems to be independent of the method of computing standard errors, in particular
in the specications including all control variables.
Second, Table A.2 in the appendix shows the estimates (i) for other institutional quality
measures (government eectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption and the
freedom of press) and (ii) for dierent data sources (ICRG, World Bank and Freedom
House data). The results are very similar to those in Table 3, which is not surprising, since
the employed measures of institutional quality are highly correlated.
Third, as often addressed in the literature, the degree of CBI may be endogenous and,
for example, could depend on the national ination history. Hence, the change in CBI
might, to some extent, be related to the initial level of ination tax. To address a possible
endogeneity bias in our main results, we perform the following procedure: in the rst step,
we verify that the initial level of ination is a determinant of the change in independence
by estimating
CBIi = 0 + 1  
T
80=89;i + 2  CBI80=89;i + 3  IQ + t (6)
where a signicant 1 indicates endogeneity. For all applied institutional measures, the
parameter turns out to be signicantly positive. As an example: in the specication with
democratic accountability, the coecient is (1 = 0:26) and signicant at the 1%-level. It
seems that countries with poor initial ination performance adjust central bank laws more
substantially. Not surprisingly, the parameter 2 is signicantly negative; i.e., countries
with a higher initial level of independence experience smaller changes in CBI. In the second
18step, we use the residuals t as an instrument variable for the change in CBI and estimate
equation (3) using Two-Stage Least Squares. The residuals seem to be a suitable instrument
because they can be interpreted as the fraction of the change in independence that is not
determined by ination history. The residuals are not correlated with the initial level
of ination (T
80=89;i) but are strongly correlated with the change in CBI; i.e, a bivariate
correlation of 89% (91%) for democratic accountability (political stability). The results
indicate that endogeneity is not a major diculty in our estimation. The results based
on similar specications as those in Table 3 are displayed in Table A.4 of the appendix
and conrm our previous ndings. Consequently, we interpret our results as causation, not
only as correlation. Suciently large changes in CBI seem to lead to ination performance
enhancement.
We estimate a number of additional specications, the results of which are displayed in
Table A.5 in the appendix. The basis for these estimations is the specication in column
(6) of Table 3; i.e., with democratic accountability and all control variables.16 In column
(1), we use standard year-on-year ination rates as dependent variable. The qualitative
results remain unchanged. In column (2), we leave out the initial level of the ination tax
since, unsurprisingly, the initial level eect explains most of the change in the ination
tax. The results reveal that quite a large proportion of the variance in the ination tax
change can still be explained by the remaining variables (adj. R2 of 34%). In column
(3), we address the issue that the absolute change in CBI and ination tax might be a
biased proxies when trying to measure the true link between CBI and ination, because
they are limited to the unit interval. As a robustness check we base the estimation on
the relative changes in CBI and ination tax. The results, however, remain virtually
unchanged. As shown above, the change in CBI is likely to depend on its initial level which
might distort the empirical evidence on the link between CBI and ination. Similar to
the two-stage procedure to control for endogeneity between CBI and ination, we use the
residuals of equation (6) as an adjusted measure of the change in CBI. The results are
shown in column (4). In column (5), we add an interaction term between the change in
CBI and (log)GDP per capita to test whether the eectiveness of CBI is higher or lower
in richer countries. The interaction term turns out to be signicantly negative without
substantially altering the level and signicance of the coecients of interest. Only the
coecient of CBI is now positive (but insignicant). The signicant interaction implies
that, when controlling for dierent political institutions, richer countries are characterized
16Note, that the control variables are not reported. The results are also robust for other specications and are available from
the authors upon request.
19by lower eectiveness of innovations in central bank design. The interaction term might to
some extent capture additional determinants of the eectiveness of CBI which go beyond
political institutions. For instance, richer countries might also have a long history of price
stability which in fact may be due to higher degrees of conservatism. Since conservatism
and CBI matter for ination performance, innovations in CBI may not be as relevant for
ination when the degree of conservatism is already high. In column (6), we make use of
turnover rates of central banks presidents as provided by Crowe and Meade (2007). As
we have explained earlier, indices of legal CBI might not be good proxies for factual CBI,
in particular in developing and transition countries. However, turnover rates which aim
at a direct measurement of factual CBI only capture one aspect of CBI. We also loose 10
observations due to data availability. On the basis of turnover rates, we are not able to
identify a signicant relation between the eectiveness of CBI and the quality of political
institutions.
4 Conclusions
From a theoretical perspective, increasing CBI helps to solve the time-inconsistency pro-
blem and should therefore improve countries' ination performance. However, empirical
evidence supporting this conventional view is somewhat inconsistent. In this paper, we
argue that one reason for the ambiguous results might be that the conditions under which
CBI helps to maintain stable prices have been widely neglected in the literature. We argue
that the quality of political institutions is an important determinant of the relationship
between CBI and ination.
The main questions of the paper were as follows. Can we identify a relationship between
CBI and ination? If so, does the institutional quality of countries inuence this relation-
ship? How do institutional quality and CBI interact with each other?
Two empirical results should be stressed. First, in exploiting the time dimension of the
data, we are not able to identify a signicant linear relationship between changes in CBI
and changes in ination. However, we nd evidence of a nonlinear relationship between
the variables. We are able to provide some evidence that the marginal eect of increasing
CBI on changes in the ination tax is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes.
Therefore, we conclude that only suciently large changes in CBI improve ination perfor-
mance. Second, we nd strong evidence that institutional quality has a signicant impact
on the relationship between CBI and ination. Institutional quality seems to improve CBI
20eectiveness in inuencing ination performance. The estimation results clearly indicate
that for a given change in CBI, the marginal eect increases with institutional quality.
The analysis has revealed that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily
lead to better ination performance. To lower ination by increasing independence, two
conditions have to be fullled: (1) the change in independence must be suciently large
and (2) the quality of institutions must be suciently high. Furthermore, institutions
and variations in CBI seem to be (imperfect) substitutes. Our analysis also helps us to
understand the mixed results in the previous empirical literature. Institutional quality is
an important determinant of the relationship between CBI and ination and should not be
neglected in academic and political debates on monetary policy.
Our sample period covers the 'great moderation' which is characterized by a widespread
downturn in economic volatility [Stock and Watson (2002)]. Also, ination (persistence) is
signicantly reduced [Cogley et al. (2010)]. Besides 'good luck', the 'great moderation' is
also attributable to improved monetary policy [Summers (2005)]. In line with this evidence,
our results indicate that innovations in central bank design, e.g. more independent central
banks, are one determinant of the 'great moderation'.
The results in this paper have to be interpreted with some caution. Due to the lack of
reliable and time-varying data of actual CBI and conservatism, any analysis on the basis
of legal indicators of CBI face a possible bias through measurement problems. However,
when restricting the sample to OECD countries, in which legal CBI should be better
proxy for actual CBI than in developing and transition countries, the evidence in favor
of the eectiveness of CBI and the relevance of institutional quality is even stronger. If
conservatism would have increased in many countries, we would overestimate the marginal
eect of CBI changes on ination changes. The robustness analysis has revealed that the
qualitative results remain stable when at least indirectly controlling for dierent levels of
conservatism.
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Figure A.1: Marginal eect of CBI on 




































































Figure A.2: Marginal eect of CBI on 
T: Democratic Accountability
25Table A.1: Results of equation (1) and (2) (ordinary standard errors).
Dependent variable: Change in ination () or ination tax (
T)
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant -0.307 -0.042** -0.132 -0.036* -0.035 -0.019
(-0.51) (-2.28) (-0.21) (-1.92) (-0.98) (-1.47)
80=90 1.014*** { { { 1.019*** { { { 0.865*** { { {
(17.07) (17.04) (10.78) (12.63)

T
80=89 { { { 0.924*** { { { 0.947*** { { { 0.802***
(15.53) (15.73) (12.63)
CBI -0.733 -0.038 -4.471 -0.237* -0.264 -0.135*
(-0.39) (-0.72) (-0.98) (-1.85) (-1.11) (-1.69)
(CBI)
2 { { { { { { 7.007 0.368* 0.467 0.218
(0.90) (1.70) (1.16) (1.60)
No. observ. 69 69 69 69 62 62
adj. R
2 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.65 0.72
F-statistic 146.78*** 123.38*** 97.85*** 85.56*** 38.78*** 53.56***
All columns with odd numbers refer to the change in ination and all columns with even numbers
refer to the change in ination tax. In columns (5) and (6) all countries which experienced an
absolute change in ination of more than 200 percentage points are excluded. All t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. Estimates are based on ordinary standard errors. Signicance levels are
reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1%-signicance-level.
26Table A.2: Results for Democracy Accountability and Political Stability (ordinary standard errors)
Dependent variable: Change in ination tax
{Political Stability{ {Democratic Accountability{
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant -0.185*** 0.120 -0.660* -0.063 -0.286*** 0.100 -1.027*** -0.220
(-3.05) (0.76) (-2.03) (-0.27) (-3.16) (0.66) (-3.64) (-0.86)

T
80=89 1.014*** 1.074*** 1.271*** 1.113*** 0.984*** 1.051*** 1.024*** 1.108***
(17.54) (17.19) (8.46) (12.44) (17.67) (19.49) (12.13) (13.98)
CBI -0.353* -0.425** -0.630** -0.297 -0.536** -0.604 -0.561* -0.472
(-1.89) (-2.40) (-2.78) (-0.48) (-2.64) (-3.41)*** (-1.96) (-0.79)
(CBI)
2 0.279 0.292* 0.119 0.577 0.172 0.139 0.034 0.162
(1.44) (1.72) (1.24) (0.82) (0.92) (0.94) (0.47) (0.31)
IQ 0.495** 0.268 0.615 0.638 0.893** 0.621** 2.674*** 1.090
(2.17) (1.21) (1.45) (1.20) (2.63) (2.18) (4.25) (1.57)
(IQ)
2 -0.375 -0.125 -0.513 -0.418 -0.717** -0.388 -1.908*** -0.973
(-1.62) (-0.58) (-1.27) (-0.89) (-2.34) (-1.54) (-4.41) (-1.52)
IQCBI 0.272 0.434* 0.795** -0.102 0.577** 0.748*** 0.680* 0.589
(1.17) (1.99) (2.72) (-0.10) (2.20) (3.36) (2.01) (0.59)
GDP80=89 { { { 0.007 0.015 0.013 { { { 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.85) (1.48) (0.69) (0.75) (0.92) (0.46)
GDPpc80=89 { { { -0.014 0.030 -0.003 { { { -0.024 0.004 -0.001
(-0.79) (1.04) (-0.11) (-1.67) (0.22) (-0.05)
TRADE80=89 { { { -0.043* 0.018 -0.056 { { { -0.042** 0.006 -0.037
(-1.94) (0.91) (-1.46) (-2.10) (0.50) (-1.10)
GDP { { { 0.077 -0.097 0.080 { { { 0.110 0.021 0.031
(1.08) (-0.99) (0.74) (1.57) (0.32) (0.25)
GDPpc { { { -0.015 0.153 -0.007 { { { -0.047 -0.032 0.093
(-0.18) (1.23) (-0.05) (-0.61) (-0.37) (0.67)
TRADE { { { -0.137*** -0.022 -0.160*** { { { -0.133*** -0.003 -0.145***
(-4.42) (-0.68) (-2.82) (-4.96) (-0.12) (-3.02)
PEGGED { { { 0.018 -0.006 0.022 { { { 0.019 0.005 0.024
(0.92) (-0.48) (0.58) (1.10) (0.52) (0.66)
East Asia { { { 0.027 { { { { { { { { { 0.045 { { { { { {
(0.67) (1.28)
Latin America { { { 0.012 { { { { { { { { { 0.004 { { { { { {
(0.38) (0.13)
Sub-Saharan { { { -0.084** { { { { { { { { { -0.097*** { { { { { {
(-2.43) (-3.13)
No. observ. 69 68 30 38 69 68 30 38
adj. R
2 0.84 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.85 0.92 0.97 0.89
F-statistic 59.22*** 34.45*** 26.98*** 20.21*** 65.68 49.41*** 65.23*** 24.79***
Estimates are based on ordinary standard errors. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are
reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% signicance-level.
27Table A.3: Results for Political Stability and Democratic Accountability (TSLS-estimates)
Dependent variable: Change in ination tax
{Political Stability{ {Democratic Accountability{
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant -0.182** 0.119 -0.470 -0.048 -0.287 0.110 -0.902*** -0.212
(-2.33) (0.57) (-1.25) (-0.16) (-1.60) (0.65) (-3.25) (-1.13)

T
80=89 1.017*** 1.070*** 1.234*** 1.097*** 0.983*** 1.052*** 1.03*** 1.103***
(17.39) (18.11) (8.55) (19.88) (21.20) (22.08) (10.82) (17.44)
CBI -0.415** -0.421** -0.909*** -0.546 -0.535** -0.552** -0.751*** -0.513
(-2.14) (-2.15) (-2.98) (-0.68) (-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.97) (-0.71)
(CBI)
2 0.408* 0.255 0.149 0.841 0.209 -0.058 0.037 0.055
(1.93) (1.51) (1.11) (0.73) (1.61) (-0.29) (0.49) (0.09)
IQ 0.494* 0.263 0.728 0.472 0.894 0.627 2.505*** 1.027*
(1.83) (1.13) (1.70) (1.33) (1.35) (1.59) (3.98) (2.01)
(IQ)
2 -0.382 -0.131 -0.685 -0.309 -0.717 -0.398 -1.836*** -0.951*
(-1.59) (-0.65) (-1.73) (-0.65) (-1.26) (-1.42) (-3.97) (-2.04)
IQCBI 0.281 0.491** 1.175*** 0.382 0.555* 0.832** 0.910*** 0.836
(1.34) (2.24) (3.19) (0.35) (1.80) (2.61) (3.10) (0.74)
GDP80=89 { { { 0.007 0.014 0.011 { { { 0.006 0.004 0.006
(0.81) (1.53) (0.48) (0.93) (0.76) (0.53)
GDPpc80=89 { { { -0.013 0.014 -0.001 { { { -0.027 0.001 -0.002
(-0.52) (0.38) (-0.03) (-1.31) (0.05) (-0.11)
TRADE80=89 { { { -0.043* 0.016 -0.052 { { { -0.039** 0.006 -0.032
(-1.84) (0.72) (-1.05) (-2.42) (0.59) (-1.17)
GDP { { { 0.082 -0.081 0.082 { { { 0.107 -0.003 0.019
(0.97) (-0.89) (0.76) (1.33) (-0.05) (0.21)
GDPpc { { { -0.021 0.110 -0.006 { { { -0.045 -0.012 0.110
(-0.21) (1.01) (-0.03) (-0.48) (-0.15) (1.05)
TRADE { { { -0.140** -0.027 -0.159 { { { -0.131*** -0.000 -0.143**
(-2.34) (-0.86) (-1.37) (-2.97) (-0.01) (-2.11)
PEGGED { { { 0.016 -0.004 0.023 { { { 0.019 0.007 0.028
(1.19) (-0.33) (0.83) (1.28) (0.85) (0.76)
East Asia { { { 0.028 { { { { { { { { { 0.042 { { { { { {
(0.74) (1.04)
Latin America { { { 0.010 { { { { { { { { { -0.004 { { { { { {
(0.28) (-0.11)
Sub-Saharan { { { -0.087 { { { { { { { { { -0.106** { { { { { {
(-1.43) (-2.10)
No. observ. 69 68 30 38 69 68 30 38
adj. R
2 0.84 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.92 0.96 0.89
F-statistic 58.75*** 37.15*** 24.82*** 19.83*** 65.32*** 47.56*** 62.08*** 24.51***
The TSLS-estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% signicance-level.
28Table A.4: Results for alternative institutional quality measures
Dependent variable: Change in ination tax
{Government Effectiveness{ {Rule of Law{ {RQ{ {Corruption{ {FoP{
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 0.068 0.126 -0.060 0.134 -0.137 0.038 0.031 0.139
(0.43) (0.65) (-0.44) (0.49) (-1.11) (0.25) (0.16) (0.66)

T
80=89 1.051*** 1.101*** 1.065*** 1.088*** 1.024*** 1.076*** 1.030*** 1.079***
(24.95) (19.09) (22.84) (19.31) (23.38) (22.66) (21.15) (18.33)
CBI -0.45** -0.552** -0.396* -0.572 -0.459** -0.455** -0.471** -0.642**
(-2.01) (-2.27) (-1.71) (-1.63) (-2.27) (-2.08) (-2.30) (-2.25)
(CBI)
2 0.281* 0.335* 0.247* 0.293* 0.192* 0.311** 0.316** 0.244*
(1.95) (1.87) (1.88) (1.74) (1.68) (2.15) (2.31) (1.71)
IQ 1.443*** -0.440 0.983** -0.207 1.339*** 0.884** 0.649*** 0.096
(3.06) (-1.37) (2.27) (-0.64) (4.51) (2.14) (3.27) (0.61)
(IQ)
2 -0.825*** 0.297 -0.592** 0.153 -0.850*** -0.547** -0.419*** -0.103
(-2.99) (1.41) (-2.18) (0.75) (-4.31) (-2.09) (-3.18) (-0.82)
IQCBI 0.406* 0.432** 0.392 0.474 0.493** 0.395* 0.405** 0.569**
(1.85) (2.11) (1.62) (1.43) (2.31) (1.91) (2.07) (2.16)
GDP80=89 0.007 -0.001 0.011 -0.002 0.014*** 0.006 0.004 -0.005
(1.28) (-0.17) (1.48) (-0.25) (3.09) (0.94) (0.65) (-0.76)
GDPpc80=89 -0.059** 0.016 -0.030 0.009 -0.042*** -0.030 -0.013 0.007
(-2.23) (1.08) (-1.39) (0.48) (-3.03) (-1.39) (-0.84) (0.56)
TRADE80=89 -0.034* -0.046* -0.027 -0.049 -0.010 -0.034* -0.041* -0.054**
(-1.79) (-2.00) (-1.67) (-1.61) (-0.90) (-1.77) (-1.71) (-2.09)
GDP 0.097 0.013 0.065 0.016 0.064 0.046 0.052 -0.013
(1.60) (0.23) (1.14) (0.28) (1.62) (0.87) (0.91) (-0.25)
GDPpc -0.130 0.121* -0.057 0.090 -0.083 -0.011 -0.010 0.111*
(-1.42) (1.80) (-0.69) (1.38) (-1.42) (-0.16) (-0.15) (1.99)
TRADE -0.128*** -0.106** -0.122** -0.113** -0.102*** -0.119** -0.146** -0.113**
(-2.72) (-2.29) (-2.60) (-2.06) (-3.95) (-2.37) (-2.43) (-2.15)
PEGGED 0.023 0.014 0.022 0.011 0.028** 0.016 0.025 0.008
(1.60) (0.72) (1.56) (0.69) (2.04) (1.14) (1.58) (0.54)
East Asia 0.034 0.035 0.050 0.038 0.021 0.045 0.052 0.057
(1.11) (0.89) (1.35) (0.86) (0.72) (1.28) (1.47) (1.39)
Latin America 0.038 0.032 0.058 0.038 0.021 0.028 0.020 -0.008
(1.19) (1.00) (1.48) (0.99) (0.74) (0.87) (0.68) (-0.26)
Sub-Saharan -0.088* -0.064 -0.049 -0.056 -0.058* -0.069 -0.087 -0.065
(-1.80) (-1.06) (-1.15) (-0.86) (-1.85) (-1.41) (-1.50) (-1.20)
No. observ. 68 66 68 66 68 68 66 68
adj. R
2 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.89
F-statistic 47.84*** 32.10*** 44.52*** 29.92*** 86.11*** 39.28*** 36.13*** 34.44***
Estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All t-statistics reported in parentheses.
Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% signicance-level. Abbreviations:
RQ { Requlatory Quality; FoP { Freedom of Press.
29Table A.5: Results for Democratic Accountability (robustness checks)




variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 10.173 0.767* 3.520 -0.040 0.014 -0.085
(1.13) (1.86) (1.67) (-0.29) (0.09) (-0.45)




80=89 { { { { { { { { { 1.069*** 1.038*** 1.064***
(23.09) (22.72) (19.68)
CBI -18.334 -0.870** { { { { { { 0.185 { { {
(-1.45) (-2.17) (0.42)
(CBI)
2 1.728 0.283 { { { { { { 0.089 { { {
(0.39) (1.07) (0.87)
CBI-growth { { { { { { -1.193* { { { { { { { { {
(-1.93)
(CBI-growth)
2 { { { { { { 0.015 { { { { { { { { {
(0.79)
CBI-resid { { { { { { { { { -0.555** { { { { { {
(-2.48)
(CBI-resid)
2 { { { { { { { { { 0.092 { { { { { {
(0.49)
TURNOVER { { { { { { { { { { { { { { { -0.009
(-0.03)
(TURNOVER)
2 { { { { { { { { { { { { { { { 0.002
(0.02)
IQ 30.152 1.122 0.043 0.865* 0.483 1.080
(1.22) (1.29) (0.01) (1.94) (1.33) (1.36)
IQCBI 26.070 1.122** { { { { { { 1.393** { { {
(1.50) (2.25) (2.53)
IQCBI-growth { { { { { { 1.772** { { { { { { { { {
(2.08)
IQCBI-resid { { { { { { 0.808** { { { { { {
(2.58)
IQTURNOVER { { { { { { { { { { { { { { { 0.086
(0.22)
(IQ)
2 -18.984 -0.918 2.770 -0.402 -0.363 -0.625
(-1.04) (-1.22) (0.44) (-1.38) (-1.38) (-1.10)
GDPpc80=89CBI { { { { { { { { { { { { -0.130* { { {
(-1.79)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. observ. 68 68 68 68 68 58
adj. R
2 0.87 0.34 0.27 0.92 0.92 0.89
F-statistic 29.48*** 3.31*** 2.66*** 47.68*** 48.82*** 28.89***
The estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All t-statistics
reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and
*** for a 1% signicance-level. The estimation results for the control variables are not reported.
In column (1), we use the change in year-on-year ination rates () as dependent variable. In
column (2), we drop the initial level of the ination tax. In column (3), we use the relative change
in CBI (CBI-growth) as an alternative measure of innovations in central bank design and relative
change in ination tax (
T=80=89) as dependent variable. Column (4) displays the results of an
estimation on the basis of an adjusted measure of the change in CBI derived from the residuals of
equation (6) (CBI-resid). In column (5), we add an interaction term between the change in CBI
and initial (log) GDP per capita (GDPpc80=89). In column (6), we make use of turnover rates of
central banks presidents as provided by Crowe and Meade (2007) (TURNOVER).
30A.2 Data sources and description
Central bank independence (CBI) data
Data on legal central bank independence for the 1980s is taken from Cukierman et al. (1992). Crowe and Meade
(2007) provide replications of the Cukierman et al. (1992)-index based on the IMF's database of central bank laws
at the end of 2003. Values for both indicators are available for 69 countries which are listed below:
Table A.6: Sample Countries
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Dem. Rep. Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, South
Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Sin-
gapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Ination
Annual ination data (percent per annum, variable ) is taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The
ination tax (
T) is calculated on the basis of 
T = =(1 + ). Ination data for the relevant periods (1980-1989)
and (1998-2007) is constructed using unweighted averages of the available ination data at an annual frequency.
17
Institutional quality data
In our empirical analysis we make use of seven proxies for institutional quality. We distinguish between democratic
accountability, political stability, government eectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption and freedom
of press. The institutional quality measures are taken from the World Bank's Governance Indicators dataset
[Kaufmann et al. (2009)], the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset [PRS-Group (2007)] and the
Freedom House dataset [FreedomHouse (2008)]. The World Bank data are in annual frequency since 2002 and in
biannual frequency for 1996-2000. We use the unweighted average in the period from 2000 to 2005. ICRG data is
only available since 1984. Hence, we calculate the average values for the period from 1984 to 2005. With respect
to the Freedom House data we apply the annual average in the period from 1980 to 2005. To better compare
the dierent estimation results we rescale all measures to the unit interval. A value of 0 (1) represent the lowest
(highest) institutional quality.
Other controls
Data for the GDP per capita, the population to calculate the level of GDP and the measure of openness are all in
constant prices and taken from Heston et al. (2009) (Penn World Table Version 6.3, series label: rgdpl, POP and
openk). The initial level of the three variables is calculated using unweighted averages for the period from 1980 to
1989. Changes are dened as the dierence between the averages of the two periods (1980-1989) and (1998-2007).
The classication of countries according to their exchange rate regimes is based on the work of Caramazza and Aziz
(1998). Their classication refers to the year 1997 and seems adequate here since most revisions of central bank
law occurred in the 1990s.
17Where data is not available we use data provided by the DSI (Data Service & Information) in the respective countries. In
some countries ination data is only available since 1981. In this case, the average annual ination tax for the 1980s is
calculated for the period from 1981 to 1989. For Nicaragua, due to data availability the ination tax for the 1980s represents
the average of the years 1989/1990.
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